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It has been said that insanity is "doing the same thing over and over again
[and] expecting different results."' Thus, when it comes to the regulation of
executive compensation through the Internal Revenue Code,2 one must
wonder: is Congress insane?3  Although this Article does not answer that
question directly, it does explore why Congress continues to enact the same
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1. RAJA KHALIDI & SAHAR TAGHDISI-RAD, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE &
DEV., THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF PROLONGED OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
ISRAELI POLICY TOWARDS THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY iii (2009), available at
http://www.unctad .org/en/docs/gds20092_en.pdf.
2. All section references, unless otherwise stated, are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(Code), as amended, and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
3. Albert Einstein also said that "[t]he hardest thing in the world to understand is the
income tax." Tax Quotes, IRS.Gov, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=l 10483, 00.html
(last updated May 20, 2011). So, perhaps, the answer is that Congress does not fully understand
what it is doing.
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types of tax penalties on executive compensation when such provisions are
ineffective, inefficient, and inequitable.4
Early legislative attempts to regulate executive compensation did not take
the form of tax rules. Rather, the federal government regulated executive
compensation largely through other means, such as mandated disclosures. 6
4. Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive
Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 383, 410, 417 (2008) (noting the ineffectiveness
of §§ 162(m) and 280G); William A. Drennan, The Pirates Will Party on! The Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation Rules Will Not Prevent CEOs from Acting Like Plundering Pirates and
Should Be Scuttled, 33 VT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (arguing that § 409A should be repealed due to
ineffectiveness); Jamie Dietrich Hankinson, Golden Parachute Tax Provisions Fall Flat: Tax
Gross-Ups Soften Their Impact to Executives and Square D Overinflates Their Coverage, 34
STETSON L. REV. 767, 783-89 (2005) (demonstrating ways the intended effects of §§ 280G and
4999 can be circumvented); Michael J. Hussey, Has Congress Stopped Executives From Raiding
the Bank? A Critical Analysis ofI.R.C. § 409A, 75 UMKC L. REV. 437, 439 (2006) (concluding
"§ 409A does not adequately address the perceived abuses regarding nonqualified deferred
compensation"); Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 884 (2007) (concluding that § 162(m) is likely an ineffective
provision); Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?,
72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 81, 94-100 (1998) (concluding that §§ 162(m) and 280G are ineffective at
controlling executive compensation); Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions: Time
for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 128-29 (2001) (arguing that the golden parachute provisions
are not only ineffective but also counterproductive); Edward A. Zelinsky, Greenmail, Golden
Parachutes and the Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Critique of Sections 280G, 4999 and
5881, 35 VILL. L. REV. 131, 134 (1990) (concluding that §§ 280G and 4999 "embody a serious
misuse of the Code" and "have exacerbated the perceived problems at which they are aimed");
Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal Attempts to Regulate
the Market for Corporate Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 178,
180-87 (1993) (examining the deficiencies in using tax penalties to try to regulate the takeover
market); Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying to
Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1680 (2004)
(concluding Congress cannot effectively limit executive compensation by using the Code to
provide disincentives). Although these scholars agree that tax penalties on executive
compensation do not effectively achieve their stated legislative goals, none have yet considered
why Congress nevertheless continues to enact such provisions.
5. See MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND
TAXATION, 1933-1939 74-90 (1984) (discussing attempts to restrain executive compensation
levels in the New Deal era).
6. Id at 76-80. Executive pay arrangements first received public attention in the
mid-1930s, during the Great Depression. Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A
Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L. REV. 937, 938-939 (1993); see also HARRY G. HENN,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 487 (2d ed.
1970) (noting post-Depression interest in executive compensation). Then, like now, executives
who appeared to be unaffected by or somehow profiting from the economic distress of ordinary
Americans were pilloried. See LEFF, supra note 5, at 74-76. In response, Congress and the
administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt undertook a number of efforts designed to
curtail executive compensation levels. See id at 74-90. These efforts fell into two broad
categories: mandated disclosures and salary limits for government contractors. Id. Some view
the sharp increase in marginal tax rates during the 1930s as an attempt to use the Code to regulate
executive compensation. See, e.g., Elson, supra, at 938-99 (noting that Congress's response to
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Since the 1980s, however, each time executive compensation has become an
issue of national interest, Congress has enacted tax provisions specifically
designed to influence executive compensation practices.
Although each of these tax provisions has a different genesis, focus, and
design, they share an important characteristic: each one is a tax penalty
provision. As such, they aim to alter corporate and executive behavior by
making it more costly to engage in certain compensation practices that
Congress has identified as undesirable.9 In theory, increased costs should deter
companies and their executives from engaging in those targeted practices.' 0 In
reality, many companies and their executives maneuver around these penalties
to achieve roughly the same ends that were possible prior to the enactment of
these provisions." Many others proceed undeterred by the existence of these
penalties.12
Part I of this Article introduces these tax penalty provisions. Then, Part II
discusses the flaws inherent in using the tax system to try to modify non-tax
behavior. Given these weaknesses, Part III considers Congress's continual use
of tax penalties to respond to debates over executive compensation. In
particular, Part III examines such legislation and finds that it does not serve a
meaningful instrumental or expressive function. Part IV concludes that the
Code is a poor legislative tool for regulating executive compensation
practices-a lesson that Congress has repeatedly failed to learn. If Congress
wants to effectively alter corporate and executive behavior, a new strategy is
needed. Part IV also briefly evaluates Congress's options in that regard.
I. THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION TAX PENALTY PROVISIONS
Tax law is aimed at much more than merely raising revenue. Congress also
often strives to influence the non-tax behavior of taxpayers by enacting
increased executive compensation levels in the 1930s was to raise income tax rates on high-
income taxpayers). That legislative response, however, was not limited to affecting executives.
7. See infra Part l.A-C (discussing the enactment of §§ 280G and 4999 (1984), § 162(m)
(1993), and § 409A (2004)). A question that might arise is whether the 1980s serve as an
appropriate reference date. Although § 162(a)(1), which imposes a reasonableness limit on
compensation deductions, was enacted long before the 1980s, it has not been used to regulate
compensation paid to public company executives. For more information on the function of
§ 162(a)(1) in this context, see Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of
Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 485, 509-10 n.90
(2009).
8. These tax provisions serve a penal function and are not aimed at measuring a taxpayer's
net income or raising revenue. See infra Part I.A-C. Here, the targeted conduct is legal, but
viewed as undesirable. See Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax
Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REv. 343, 346-360 (1989).
9. See infra Part I.A-C.
10. See infra Part I.A-B.
I1. See infra Part I.A-C.
12. See infra Part I.A-C.
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provisions designed to reward taxpayers for engaging in certain seemingly
desirable activities and to penalize them for engaging in certain seemingly
undesirable activities.' 3 Congress rewards and penalizes various activities by
affecting the after-tax costs of particular transactions.14
To encourage taxpayers to engage in those transactions deemed desirable,
Congress enacts provisions that confer "deductions, credits, exclusions,
exemptions, deferrals, and preferential rates."' 5  These types of provisions
operate to reduce the after-tax costs of engaging in certain activities, in theory
making those activities more attractive to taxpayers.' 6 For example, the Code
encourages individual taxpayers to buy homes, rather than rent, by providing a
tax deduction for interest paid on a qualifying home mortgage, as well as
preferential tax treatment on the profit one might make from selling a home. 17
To deter taxpayers from entering into transactions deemed undesirable,
Congress enacts provisions that alter what would otherwise be the normal
operating tax rules in a manner that penalizes the targeted conduct., Such
penalty provisions "deny favored tax statuses, impose special taxes, or
disallow, limit, or postpone tax credits or deduction," thereby increasing the
13. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 705 (1970)
(evaluating Congress's use of the tax code to effectuate social policy goals); Zolt, supra note 8, at
343-46 (examining tax code provisions that encourage or discourage behavior); see also
Hartman, supra note 4, at 159-60 (exploring the use of tax laws to further social policy); Stabile,
supra note 4, at 83, 94-100 (discussing the use of the tax code to achieve social policy goals in
the area of executive compensation).
14. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 489.
15. Surrey, supra note 13, at 706. See also Zolt, supra note 8, at 343 ("Congress
encourages good conduct by providing special tax statuses, rates, exclusions, deductions, or
credits.").
16. Zolt, supra note 8, at 343 ("These tax benefits . . . subsidize the favored activity by
reducing tax liability.").
17. See I.R.C. § 121 (2006) (excluding from income gains resulting from the sale of one's
home, subject to certain limitations); I.R.C. § 163 (allowing a deduction for interest on
indebtedness, subject to limits); see also Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 334, 336-39 (2009) (discussing how the tax code encourages taxpayers to
purchase homes); Mark Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of
Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 157, 158-59 (2005) (explaining the tax
incentives of homeownership).
18. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m) (denying a deduction for compensation paid to certain
employees, to the extent the compensation exceeds $1,000,000 and is not tied to performance);
1.R.C. § 280G (denying a deduction for an excess parachute payment); 1.R.C. § 409A (imposing
additional taxes for deferred compensation in certain circumstances); I.R.C. § 4999 (imposing an
additional tax on excess parachute payments). The aforementioned normal operating income tax
rules are the
already existing rules that would apply to determine the tax consequences in the
absence of a subsequently enacted rule clearly disallowing that treatment or prescribing
different treatment in order to penalize the taxpayer; it is not meant to refer to a
comparison of current rules to a normative income tax.
Mullane, supra note 7, at 489 n. 13 (citing Zolt, supra note 8, at 348).
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after-tax costs of undesirable activities. 19 In theory, the increased cost will
discourage taxpayers from engaging in the conduct.2
Over the course of the last few decades, Congress has concluded that several
executive compensation practices are undesirable.21 Congress thus tried to
discourage companies and their executives from engaging in those
compensation practices and used the Code to do so. Congress first enacted tax
provisions in an attempt to discourage companies from offering, and
22executives from receiving, golden parachute payments above a defined level.
Almost a decade later, Congress enacted legislation to deter companies from
paying executives more than $1,000,000 unless the compensation was tied to
the executive's performance at the company.23  More recently, Congress
sought to discourage certain types of executive deferred compensation terms
24and benefits. From a superficial standpoint, the provisions enacted to
discourage these undesired activities appear very different: they each have a
different penesis, focus, and design. However, they all serve a penal
function. Accordingly, they attempt to shape or deter behavior by increasing
the costs of engaging in the targeted, undesirable activities. 27
In the executive compensation context, Congress uses two primary
deterrence methods: disallowing or limiting a company's ability to take an
otherwise allowable deduction for the compensation it pays and imposing
additional taxes on the compensation an executive receives.2  These methods
exemplify the inherent limitations in using the tax system as a means to
discourage non-tax taxpayer behavior.29 For instance, sophisticated tax
planners are able to shunt their way around many statutory obstacles to achieve
the desired results of their clients. 30 More significantly, even if a statutory
bypass is unavailable or otherwise unappealing, the Code is limited to
influencing non-tax taxpayer behavior because the Code merely provides how
certain transactions are to be taxed and thus does not prohibit them.3 As a
result, taxpayers are free to engage in an undesirable activity and incur any
19. See Zolt, supra note 8, at 344.
20. Id
21. See, e.g., LEFF, supra note 5, at 74-90 (discussing attempts to restrain executive
compensation levels in the New Deal era); Stabile, supra note 4, at 84-93 (detailing more recent
efforts to police executive compensation).
22. See I.R.C. § 280G; I.R.C. § 4999; see also infra Part I.A.
23. See I.R.C. § 162(m); see also infra Part lB.
24. See I.R.C. § 409A; see also infra Part I.C.
25. Compare I.R.C. § 4999, with I.R.C. § 162(m), and I.R.C. § 409A.
26. See Zolt, supra note 8, at 345-65.
27. Id at 344.
28. See infra Part l.A-C.
29. See Zolt, supra note 8, at 356-60.
30. See Drennan, supra note 4, at 28.
31. See Zolt, supra note 8, at 359. The Code does prohibit tax-related behavior, such as
engaging in tax fraud. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7206 (2006).
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ensuing tax penalty.32  Many corporate taxpayers, for example, are largely
indifferent to the additional costs that the executive compensation tax penalties
impose.33
The executive compensation tax penalty provisions suffer from the
aforementioned limitations, as well as other defects that render them
34ineffective in achieving their stated goals. Making the situation appear even
bleaker, these provisions also have led to negative, unanticipated
consequences.3 5  Given these results, it is questionable why Congress
continues to enact tax penalties on executive compensation.
A. Targeting Golden Parachute Agreements
Sections 280G and 4999 are tax penalty provisions that were enacted to
restrain the size of certain executive severance agreements, referred to as
golden parachutes.36 Starting in the early 1980s, golden parachutes became a
very popular component of many executive compensation packages.37
Congress became concerned about the effect these agreements would have on
the business market and shareholders.38 In particular, Congress was concerned
"that sizeable golden parachutes would (1) result in a target's shareholders
being paid less for their stock in a takeover, (2) discourage potential buyers,
and (3) encourage management to pursue a transaction that was not in the best
interest of the shareholders in order to reap the financial rewards of a
parachute."39
32. See Joy Sabino Mullane, Tax Penalties on Executive Compensation: Is the Cure Worse
than the Disease?, 6 AM. U. Bus. L. BRIEF 15, 16 (2010) ("[M]any companies willingly incur the
penalties imposed on them and absorb the penalties imposed on their executives.").
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part 11 (discussing the inherent flaws of tax penalties).
35. See Drennan, supra note 4, at 4-5.
36. See I.R.C. § 280G (2006); I.R.C. § 4999. The golden parachute provisions were
Congress's first effort to directly affect executive compensation via tax penalty provisions. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text. A golden parachute, for tax purposes, "is an agreement to
make payments or provide other benefits to an executive if the company experiences a change in
ownership, effective control, or the ownership of a substantial portion of its assets." Mullane,
supra note 7, at 512 n.105 (citing I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i)). See generally William R. Spalding,
Note, Golden Parachutes: Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117,
1117-22 (1983) (explaining the function and operation of golden parachutes); Bill C. Wilson &
Diane M. McGowan, Golden Parachutes, in TAX MGM'T (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Portfolio No.
396, 2008).
37. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GEN. EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 199-200 (Comm. Print 1984)
[hereinafter DEFRA J. Comm. Print]. The proliferation of golden parachute agreements during
the early 1980s was in response to the heightened level of acquisitive activity at that time. See id.
(explaining that §§ 280G and 4999 were enacted in response to the increasing number of
corporate takeovers).
38. See id. at 200.
39. See Mullane, supra note 32, at 15 (citing DEFRA J. Comm. Print, supra note 37, at
199); see also S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984,
1050 [Vol. 60: 1
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Galvanized by these concerns, Congress enacted §§ 280G and 4999, which
are designed to work synergistically to make golden parachutes above a
defined level cost-prohibitive.40 Section 280G does its part by prohibiting
companies from taking a deduction for any excess parachute payment it makes
41to an executive. Section 4999, in turn, imposes a twenty percent tax on any
person who receives an excess parachute payment. 42
An excess parachute payment is present when a golden parachute agreement
provides for payments equal to or greater than three times a base amount,
which is determined with reference to the executive's average annual taxable
compensation. 43 The excess parachute payment is the portion of the golden
parachute payment that exceeds the base amount.44  Thus, so long as the
golden parachute limits payments to less than three times the executive's
annual compensation, the corporation may deduct any payments made
pursuant to the agreement and the executive will not incur penalty taxes. 45 if,
however, the agreement provides a payout that exceeds the limit, then the
EXPLANATION OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMM. ON MAR. 21, 1984 195 (Comm. Print
1984) [hereinafter DEFRA S. Comm. Print].
40. See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 4, at 91 (commenting that §§ 280G and 4999 were
expected "to make excessive parachute payments financially prohibitive" for companies and their
executives); see also Hankinson, supra note 4, at 778 (noting that Congress intended §§ 280G and
4999 to work together to reduce the largesse of golden parachutes). It should be noted that
§§ 280G and 4999 only apply to a limited group of individuals, comprised of employees and
independent contractors who are also either shareholders, officers, or highly compensated
individuals. See I.R.C. § 280G(c). A highly compensated individual is defined as one "who is
(or would be if the individual were an employee) a member of the group consisting of the highest
paid 1 percent of the employees of the corporation or, if less, the highest paid 250 employees of
the corporation." Id. The targeted group is further limited in that the golden parachute provisions
do not apply to payments made by a small business or by a company whose stock is not readily
tradable and three-quarters of whose shareholders have approved the payments. See I.R.C.
§ 280G(b)(5). The discussion of the golden parachute provisions does not address the recently
enacted rules that apply to employers participating in the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP). See, e.g., I.R.C. § 280G(e). See generally Janice Kay McClendon, The Perfect Storm:
How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a
Wake-Up Call for Reforming Executive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131, 156-72 (2009)
(discussing the rules under TARP).
41. See I.R.C. §280G(a).
42. See I.R.C. §4999(a). The company must withhold the twenty percent penalty tax from
its payment to the executive. See I.R.C. § 4999(c)(1). A deduction for the amount of the penalty
tax is also specifically disallowed. See I.R.C. § 275(a)(6).
43. I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)-(3), (d).
44. I.R.C. § 280G(a)-(b), (d); see Mullane, supra note 7, at 515 n.l 17 (providing a detailed
definition of an excess parachute payment).
45. 1.R.C. § 162(a)(1). For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the compensation
the company seeks to deduct is otherwise considered reasonable compensation within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). It should be noted, though, that § 162(a)(1) is rarely applied to
public companies, and when the IRS has attempted to do so, it has been unsuccessful. See
Mullane, supra note 7, at 509, n.90.
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company forgoes the ability to take a full deduction for any amounts paid and
the executive will owe penalty taxes.46
To illustrate, suppose an executive earns, on average, $3,000,000 in taxable
compensation each year. The executive also has a golden parachute capped at
2.99 times this base amount. In this case, if and when the parachute opens, the
payout will be $8,970,000.47 Because this payment is within the limits of the
golden parachute provisions, the executive will pay only those taxes normally
due on compensation and no more.48 The company will also be able to take a
deduction for the payment worth $3,139,500, assuming a thirty-five percent
corporate tax rate.
If, on the other hand, the golden parachute payment were set at three times
the executive's base amount, then the payout would be $9,000,000.o In this
situation, §§ 280G and 4999 would take effect to increase the after-tax costs
for both the executive and the company.5 1  The executive would owe an
additional penalty tax of $1,800,000, reducing the parachute payment to
$7,200,000, before taxes otherwise normally due are paid.52  This is clearly
less advantageous for the executive than the original payment, which initially
appears to be less-$8,970,000 versus $9,000,000-but is not subject to the
$1,800,000 penalty tax. 53 The value of the company's deduction would also be
reduced to $1,050,000, thereby costing the company $2,089,500 more in the
form of a foregone deduction, just to pay the executive an additional face
amount of $30,000.54
46. 1.R.C. § 280G(a)-(b); I.R.C. § 4999(a).
47. Multiplying $3,000,000 by 2.99 produces this figure. See Wolk, supra note 4, at 142
(noting the "2.99 times compensation" formula).
48. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 496, 500 (noting that taxes normally due on compensation
would include income and applicable payroll taxes).
49. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1). The value of the deduction is determined by multiplying the
payment amount by the corporation's tax rate (i.e., $8,970,000 x 0.35). See Mullane, supra note
7, at 511 (providing an example assuming a corporate tax rate of forty percent).
50. Multiplying $3,000,000 by three produces this figure. See I.R.C. § 280G (noting that a
payment equal to or greater than three times the executive's base amount produces an excess
parachute payment).
51. See id. (disallowing a deduction for an excess parachute payment); I.R.C. § 4999(a)
(imposing a twenty percent tax on an excess parachute payment).
52. The $7.2 million figure is derived by multiplying $9,000,000 by twenty percent and
subtracting the result from $9,000,000 ($9,000,000-($9,000,000 x .20) = $7,200,000). See I.R.C.
§ 4999 (imposing a twenty percent penalty tax on excess parachute payments and requiring
companies to withhold the tax from any such payments made to an executive).
53. But see Mullane, supra note 7, at 517 (providing examples of how executives may avoid
bearing the financial consequences of this penalty tax).
54. In this part of the example, the excess parachute payment, which is the nondeductible
portion of the payment, is $6,000,000 (or $9,000,000 less the $3,000,000 base amount). 26 U.S.C
§ 280G(a) (disallowing a deduction for an excess parachute payment); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-
861, at 849 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1537 [hereinafter DEFRA Conference
Report] (providing an example demonstrating that only the excess parachute payment is
nondeductible and that the base amount remains deductible). Thus, only $3,000,000 of the
[Vol. 60:11052
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In theory, then, both parties to a golden parachute agreement have an
incentive to avoid contracting for excess parachute payments. In order to be
able to fully deduct payments, companies would want to limit the amount of a
golden parachute award to ensure that it is within the boundaries set by
§ 280G. Correspondingly, an executive would prefer such an agreement in
order to receive more money on an after-tax basis than if the initial payout was
larger but subject to additional taxes that yield less on an after-tax basis.
To be sure, some companies carefully design their golden parachute
agreements to conform to the deductibility parameters set by § 280G.
However, this compliance does not necessarily mean that the payout levels of
these agreements have been restrained. To begin, the golden parachute
provisions likely have had a legitimizing effect on these agreements and have
encouraged a minimum, not maximum, payout level of 2.99 times an
executive's base amount.ss Moreover, there are a number of ways to
manipulate the base amount that is used to determine the limit imposed by
56§ 280G. For example, a company can choose to pay an executive more on an
annual basis in order to raise the level at which § 280G applies.5 ' This
maneuver neither restrains the size of the golden parachute nor reduces
shareholder costs.58
In the end, however, many companies choose to purposely forego a
deduction in order to offer a golden parachute in excess of the § 280G limit.59
payment is deductible, as compared with the full $8,970,000 in the earlier part of the example.
See id The value of the deduction is accordingly $1,050,000 (or $3,000,000 x 0.35), which is
$2,089,500 less than the $3,139,500 value of a fully deductible payment of $8,970,000.
55. See, e.g., Richard P. Bress, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 955, 963 n.38 (1987). ("[Tlax law may have inadvertently created a floor on parachute
benefits by codifying a salary multiple that executives might henceforth point to as a
congressionally sanctified standard of reasonableness."); Miske, supra note 4, at 1680 ("By
codifying a salary multiple, § 280G created a floor on parachute benefits that directors and
executives could point to as a congressionally sanctioned standard of reasonableness."); Wolk,
supra note 4, at 142 ("[I]t has been suggested that the golden parachute provisions legitimized the
2.99 times average annual compensation standard, causing such arrangements to become more
common.").
56. See, e.g., Wolk, supra note 4, at 142-44 (discussing several ways corporations can
manipulate the base amount).
57. See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 4, at 92 ("Fear of triggering the loss of deduction and
imposition of an excise tax may prompt companies to pay executives more in the form of signing
bonuses or increased annual income instead of providing for payments contingent on a change in
control.")
58. See, e.g., id. (providing an example of such manipulation and noting that although the
executive receives the desired compensation in other forms, the company's compensation costs
increase).
59. See Executive Compensation: Backdating to the Future: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 109th Cong. 29-30 (2006) [hereinafter Backdating Hearing] (statement of Steven
Balsam, Professor of Accounting, Temple University); Michael E. Murphy, Attacking the
Classified Board of Directors: Shaky Foundations for Shareholder Zeal, 65 Bus. LAW. 441,
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More significantly, many also enter into so-called gross-up agreements, which
reimburse executives for the concomitant twenty percent penalty tax incurred
under § 4999.60 These agreements effectively shift the economic burden of the
twenty percent penalty tax from the executive to the corporation.61 For the
company, a gross-up agreement can triple the after-tax costs of a golden
parachute.62 For the executive, however, it is as if the penalty never existed in
the first place.6 3
The foregoing runs counter to some of the cost considerations that
compelled Congress to enact the golden parachute provisions, such as the
direct and indirect costs that large golden parachutes may impose on
shareholders. 64 The fact, though, that companies can and do continue to offer
extremely lucrative golden parachutes impinges on more than Congress's cost
considerations.65 The continued prevalence of excessive golden parachutes
also indicates that Congress failed in its attempt to alleviate the
anti-competitive effects of such agreements.66 The tax provisions only impose
penalties on excessive payments actually made to and received by executives
and thus fail to reach extremely lucrative golden parachutes that were never
469-70 (2010) (describing how the §280G limitation is generally enforced against less senior
officers, but is generally ignored for the CEO and other most senior officers).
60. See Wolk, supra note 4, at 139-40 (noting that such additional payments, referred to as
gross-up compensation, are taxable, treated as excess parachute payments, and thus also are
nondeductible by the corporation and subject to the twenty percent excise tax, in addition to taxes
otherwise normally due on the executive's compensation); see also Mullane, supra note 7, at 517;
Wilson & McGowan, supra note 36, at A-38 to -39. Executive pay surveys generally indicate
that roughly two-thirds of senior executives are protected by gross-up agreements. See Perri
Capell, Terminated? Who Cares? Severance-Pay Packages for CEOs Appear to be Coming Down
But Slowly, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2008, at R4 ("[T]wo-thirds of CEOs and 60% of other named
executive officers are entitled to have their severance pay increased to cover the extra taxes [of
exceeding limits]."); Joann S. Lublin & Scott Thurm, Money Rules: Behind Soaring Executive
Pay, Decades ofFailed Restraints, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at Al ("By 2004, 77% of 1,000
public concerns tracked by consulting firm Towers Perrin offered . . . gross-up[s]."). In the
current economic and media environment, firms may have cut back on many perks, but are less
inclined to eliminate golden parachute gross-up agreements. See e.g., Dana Mattioli, The CEO
Pay Survey: Perks Are Cut Amid Pushback on Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2010, at B4 (noting a
recent trend of corporations eliminating gross-ups for perks while only eliminating a small
number of gross-ups for golden parachutes).
61. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 516-17 (noting how the excise tax shifts from the
executive to the corporation).
62. See id at 518-19 (providing an example of how gross-up agreements, in combination
with other factors, can triple the after-tax cost of golden parachute payments).
63. Wilson & McGowan, supra note 36, at A-39 ("The employee will be in the same
economic position as if an excise tax did not exist.").
64. See DEFRA J. Comm. Print, supra note 37, at 199.
65. See Spalding, supra note 36, at 1117-20.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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"opened" by a change in corporate control.67 The lack of tax repercussions for
entering into such agreements allows corporations to offer golden parachutes
large enough to have a detrimental effect on acquisitive activity, as Congress
feared.68
Thus, the tax provisions targeting golden parachutes largely fail to achieve
either stated congressional objective: they neither encourage healthy market
activity by limiting the largesse of parachute agreements, nor reduce any
resultant costs to shareholders.69 Amendments to the statutes could improve
the functionality of these provisions, particularly if the underlying treasury
regulations were amended as well.70  Ultimately, though, any tax-based
solution will prove inadequate.7 ' The Code cannot prohibit extremely
generous golden parachutes; it can only make them more costly.72 Moreover,
the targeted corporate taxpayers are either largely indifferent to those increased
costs or simply place greater value on the ability to compensate their
executives however they see fit.73 It follows, then, that tax penalties are
67. See I.R.C. § 280G(a), (b)(2)(A) (2006) (limiting the section's applicability to
"payments"); Wolk, supra note 4, at 128 (noting that the tax provisions have no effect on
unrealized payments).
68. See e.g., Wolk, supra note 4, at 127-28 ("[A) golden parachute could be used to restrict
takeovers and entrench management at the expense of shareholders by making the takeover so
expensive that the golden parachute functions as a poison pill. Congress was concerned about
this aspect of the problem as well, but note that the parachute provisions do not respond to this
concern. They apply only if the takeover actually occurs and the payments are actually made;
there is no penalty on golden parachute arrangements that are so generous that they discourage
any takeover.").
69. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (noting that Congress enacted the tax
penalty provisions specifically to address the perceived negative effects on shareholders and
market efficiency). The golden parachute provisions have been widely disparaged for the
inefficient and costly way in which they fail to achieve Congress's intended objectives. See
Conway, supra note 4, at 417-19 (noting the limited effectiveness of § 280G); Hartmann, supra
note 4, at 179-81 (arguing that §§ 280G and 4999 discourage potentially beneficial effects of
golden parachutes); Stabile, supra note 4, at 93 ("[N]either with respect to ordinary compensation
nor with respect to compensation contingent on a change in control has the Code proven a very
meaningful curb on executive compensation."); Wolk, supra note 4, at 181 (arguing for repeal of
the golden parachute provisions because they "not only allow[] golden parachutes to flourish, but
achieve[] this counter-productive result in a complex and costly fashion"); Zelinsky, supra note 4,
at 134 (determining, in part, that §§ 280G and 4999 may prove to "have exacerbated the
perceived problems at which they are aimed").
70. Wolk, supra note 4, at 180-81 (suggesting that at least a few of the flaws of §§ 280G
and 4999 could be addressed by amending the statutes and the then-proposed accompanying
regulations).
71. See id at 181.
72. See Zolt, supra note 8, at 353-54 (noting that Congress uses tax penalty provisions, such
as the golden parachute statutes, to disincentivize behavior that it is either unable or unwilling to
expressly prohibit, by increasing the after-tax cost of the targeted activities).
73. See Backdating Hearing, supra note 59, at 40 (statement of Steven Balsam, Professor of
Accounting, Temple University); Hankinson, supra note 4, at 802-03; Mullane, supra note 7, at
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inherently incapable of controlling excessive golden parachutes or the
attendant costs to shareholders.
B. Targeting Annual Compensation
In 1993, almost a decade after the golden parachute provisions were enacted,
Congress turned its attention to the annual compensation paid to executives.74
Pervasive public concerns regarding executive compensation galvanized
Congress into action.75 The aims of the resulting legislation, § 162(m), were
two-fold: to curtail the amount of compensation paid to executives and to
encourage a stronger connection between executive pay and the executive's
performance.76
Employing an approach similar to § 280G, § 162(m) prohibits a company
from deducting more than $1,000,000 of the annual compensation it pays to
top executives.7 7  In other words, regardless of the amount paid to the
executive, the company's deduction is limited to $1,000,000.7 There are,
517 (noting that some companies go so far as to reimburse the executive for any personal income
tax penalty incurred).
74. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 512 (noting that §§ 280G and 4999 were enacted in 1984,
but that Congress did not enact § 162(m), targeting executive compensation, until 1993).
75. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378,
877 ("Recently, the amount of compensation received by corporate executives has been the
subject of scrutiny and criticism."); Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set
CEO Pay? The Press? Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 28
(noting that the attention executive compensation received from public officials in the 1990s had
not been that intense since the 1930s); Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, and Executive
Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 713 (1995) (recalling that media fixation on executive
compensation helped propel that issue to reach "national prominence" in 1991).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646 ("[E]xcessive compensation will be reduced if the
deduction for compensation (other than performance-based compensation) paid to the top
executives of publicly held corporations is limited."); Robert M. Halperin, Young K. Kwon &
Shelley C. Rhoades-Catanach, The Impact ofDeductibility Limits on Compensation Contracts: A
Theoretical Examination, 23 J. AM. TAX. ASS'N (SUPPLEMENT) 52, 52 (2001) (noting § 162(m)
was intended to promote a closer correlation between pay and performance, as well as to
disincentivize excessive compensation packages); Stabile, supra note 4, at 95-99 (noting that
§ 162(m) attempts to affect both "the amount [and] type of compensation paid to executives").
77. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(l)-(3) (2006). Section 162(m) is not as broad as it might initially
appear. First, it only applies to publicly held corporations, defined in § 162(m)(2) as "any
corporation issuing any class of common equity securities required to be registered under Section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Second, § 162(m) only applies to the CEO and the
three other highest paid officers at the company. See I.R.S. Notice 2007-49, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1429
(interpreting § 162(m)(1)-(3)). This Article does not address the recently enacted rules that
govern employers participating in TARP. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(5) (Supp. III 2009). See generally
Amy Pocino Kelly & Carrie Rozes, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance
Standards for TARP Recipients, Il1 J. TAX'N 230 (2009) (discussing the TARP-specific rules in
detail).
78. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(1). The $1,000,000 limit may be further reduced by the amount of
any excess parachute payment that would have been considered compensation within the meaning
of§ 162(m) if§ 280G had not disallowed a deduction. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(F).
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however, many exceptions to this $1,000,000 limitation, including a significant
exception for performance-based compensation. 79
The tax theory behind § 162(m) is that the deduction limitation would
function as a restraint on executive compensation because a company would
presumably be unwilling to incur the additional tax costs associated with
exceeding the limit.s0 To the extent a company wants to compensate an
executive in excess of $1,000,000, § 162(m) encourages companies to link
executive pay and performance by excluding performance-based pay from the
$1,000,000 deduction cap.81 The reality is that § 162(m) has not been effective
in achieving either of its goals.82 Much like the golden parachute provisions,
§ 162(m) legitimized annual compensation payments of $1,000,000, resultin
in the perception that $1,000,000 constituted a minimum threshold.
Moreover, the exceptions to the $1,000,000 deductibility cap-the
performance-based exception in particular-allow properly structured annual
executive compensation plans to render the cap "virtually meaningless." 84
79. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(c). Commissions, qualified retirement plan contributions, and
nontaxable fringe benefits are also exempted from the one million dollar deduction limitation. See
I.R.C. § 162(m)(4).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646 (indicating the Committee's belief that limiting
corporate deductions for executive compensation would discourage excessive pay packages);
Zolt, supra note 8, at 344 (stating that tax penalties, such as postponed or decreased deductions,
increase the cost of associated activities, and thus discourage the taxed behavior).
81. See Stabile, supra note 4, at 95-96 (noting that Congress intended to affect the "type" of
compensation paid to executives); supra note 77 and accompanying text.
82. See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive
Compensation Reform, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 299, 346-47 (2009) (noting that "[t]he stated goals of
162(m) are unrealized"); David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving Long-Term Focus of
Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 444 (2010) (arguing that § 162(m) has contributed to the
abuse of share options as pay); infra text accompanying notes 85-95.
83. See Backdating Hearing, supra note 59, at 24, 272 (testimony of Nell Minow, Editor,
The Corporate Library) ("When the tax code was changed to prevent executive compensation of
over $1 million to be deducted unless it was tied to performance . . . everyone got a raise to $1
million."); CEO Compensation in the Post-Enron Era: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transportation, 108th Cong. 10 (2003) [hereinafter CEO Compensation
Hearing] (statement of Brian J. Hall, Associate Professor, Harvard Business School) ("[Tjhe pay
trend makes it look as if [162(m) was] passed with the intention of accelerating, not curbing, CEO
pay increases."); John A. Byrne, That's Some Pay Cap, Bill, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 25, 1994,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1994/b336854.arc.htm ("'President Clinton
has created a minimum wage for CEOs,' declares Arnold S. Ross, a New York consultant who
designs pay packages for executives. 'A $1 million base salary is now the gold standard."').
84. See Stabile, supra note 4, at 88 ("[Tlhe performance-based compensation exception to
the $1 million limit renders section 162(m) virtually meaningless."); see also FRANK PARTNOY,
INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 156 (2003)
(noting that the performance-based exception to § 162(m) creates "a loophole large enough to fly
a private jet through"); Kevin J. Ryan, Note, Rethinking Section 162(m) 's Limitation on the
Deduction of Executive Compensation: A Review of the Commentary, 15 VA. TAX REV. 371, 372
(1995) (noting that the section's safe harbors essentially vitiate the $1,000,000 deduction
limitation).
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Not only does the performance-based exception permit an unlimited amount
to be deducted, but the threshold requirements to qualify for the exception are
also easily satisfied.85  Although compensation is performance-based only if
"payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance
goals," 86 Treasury regulations provide that a performance goal does not need to
be "based upon an increase or positive result under a business criterion and
could include, for example, maintaining the status quo or limiting economic
losses."87  Such a standard does link pay to performance, but it does not
necessarily tie pay to competent performance.8 8 Thus, an executive need not
perform well to reap substantial performance-based pay, which undermines
Congress's aims in enacting § 162(m).89
The performance-based exception has produced several other effects that
also defeat the purpose of the statutory scheme. First, overall compensation
85. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. The general rules of § 162(a), which
only allow a deduction for reasonable compensation amounts, continue to apply. See I.R.C.
§ 162(a)(1) (2006); Stabile, supra note 4, at 83 (stating that § 162(a)(1) apparently grants the IRS
"authority to disallow deductions for compensation that is viewed to be unreasonable").
However, § 162(a)(1) is rarely applied to public companies to limit a compensation deduction.
Where the IRS has attempted to do so, it has been unsuccessful. See Mullane, supra note 7, at
509 & n.90.
86. 1.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C).
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i) (as amended in 1996). Although not all performance
goals qualify under the regulation, the standard is far from strict, which significantly increases the
likelihood that the goal will be met. See id (requiring that objective goals be met, but not
limiting such goals to include positive performance). It is important to note, though, that the
performance goals must be "established by a compensation committee composed of outside
directors, approved by shareholders, and certified by the company's compensation committee as
having been met." Stabile, supra note 4, at 87. Treasury regulations elaborate that a performance
goal "must state, in terms of an objective formula or standard, the method for computing the
amount of compensation payable to the employee if the goal is attained." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-27(e)(2)(ii).
88. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. This less stringent standard does provide
flexibility, allowing companies to reward their executives for steering the company through
troubled times. Nevertheless, such a standard also allows executives to receive
performance-based pay despite potentially poor performance, undermining one of the purposes
for which § 162(m) was enacted. See supra notes 76, 87 and accompanying text.
89. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 132-33 (2004) (finding that most
executives receive generous compensation even in "cases of spectacular failure"); see also
Backdating Hearing, supra note 59, at 29 (statement of Steven Balsam, Professor of Accounting,
Temple University) ("[Slection 162(m) has, at best, been only marginally effective in reducing
executive pay and/or tying pay to performance."); id. at 272 (testimony of Nell Minow, Editor,
The Corporate Library) ("The data show that the disparity between pay and performance is
enormous and growing."); James R. Rabom, Executive Compensation: Much to Do About..., 10
HOUS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 262, 269 (2010) ("[Section] 162(m) quickly became a provision that only
required 'rearranging the deck chairs' as nearly all taxpayers were able to 'work around it'
without substantive impact by setting the performance goal hurdles low and the possible payouts
high.").
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levels increased to account for the addition of a contingent pay risk premium.90
Second, performance-based pay often became more lucrative than anticipated
due to the way it was typically awarded.91 Third, the pressure to attain certain
performance-based goals to achieve greater compensation is viewed as a
significant factor contributing to many of the corporate scandals following the
enactment of § 162(m). 92 In sum, § 162(m) is not a significant impediment for
companies that wish to reward their executives handsomely.
Other exemptions exist in addition to those explicitly provided by § 162(m).
For example, the $1,000,000 limit only applies if the executives are employed
with the company on the last day of the taxable year.93 Compensation payable
after the executive's employment has ended does not fall within the ambit of §
162(m). 94 Thus, as a result of § 162(m), many companies have encouraged
90. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 524 n.167 ("In theory, an executive receiving all or a
portion of his pay based on performance risks receiving little or no pay if the company does not
perform as expected. To offset this risk, a premium is added to the amount of compensation paid
to the executive if the company performs well, increasing overall compensation above the level
that would have been paid absent the presence of performance-based risk."). In the years
following § 162(m)'s enactment, overall CEO compensation levels increased dramatically, but
the portion of compensation comprising base salary decreased significantly. See Tod Perry &
Marc Zenner, CEO Compensation in the 1990s: Shareholder Alignment or Shareholder
Expropriation, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 123, 146 fig.1, 147 tbl.2 (2000) (displaying that base
salaries in 1992 accounted for 44.59% of total CEO compensation, but that figure was reduced to
27.85% by 1998.). The Joint Committee on Taxation recently reported that "[s]tudies have
indicated that the deduction limitation may have led to some substitution away from salary
compensation toward performance-based compensation, but that growth in overall executive
compensation has not been reduced." STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG.,
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2 (Comm. Print
2006) [hereinafter JCT Compensation Report].
91. The stock option grant has become the quintessential performance-based compensation.
See Murphy, supra note 75, at 738; see also Mullane, supra note 7, at 524 ("This is so because a
stock option's value is inherently tied to the performance of the corporation's stock if granted
with an exercise price equal to or greater than fair market value at the time of the grant: it is only
valuable if the stock price rises."). Stock prices generally began rising around the same time that
stock options became a more significant component of an executive's compensation package.
See Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Perfect Storm, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2003) (discussing
how the increased use of stock options as a form of executive compensation in the 1990s caused
pay to "balloon wildly"); Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J.
ECON. PERSP. 49, 53 (2003) (noting how the absence of limitations imposed by § 162(m) explains
"the explosion in executive option grants in the 1990s"). Thus, the stock market boom inured to
the benefit of executives receiving hefty stock option awards.
92. See, e.g., PARTNOY, supra note 84, at 156-57; Daniel Gross, Give That CEO a Pay
Raise!, SLATE (July 16, 2002, 5:21 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2067952 ("[A]s Alan
Greenspan put it today, stock options have 'perversely created incentives to artificially inflate
reported earnings in order to keep stock prices high and rising.').
93. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(3) (2006).
94. Id.
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their executives to accept a significant portion of their compensation on a
deferred basis.95
The foregoing is certainly not a complete catalogue of § 162(m)'s
shortcomings. 9 6  The discussed examples do show that § 162(m) contains
significant deficiencies that undermine its effectiveness. Even if those faults
could be rectified by, for example, amending or eliminating the performance-
based exception, § 162(m) would still be insufficient due to the simple fact that
it is a tax penalty provision.97 Thus, as was the case with the golden parachute
provisions, it does not prevent companies from offering compensation above a
defined level or impose a particular payment structure.98  The Code's only
course is to make it more costly for companies to offer compensation outside
the parameters set by § 162(m). 99 Such increased costs do not unduly trouble
many companies, as they still pay nondeductible compensation despite the
many ways to circumvent the § 162(m) limit.'00
C. Targeting Nonqualified Deferred Compensation
Section 409A addresses certain executive deferred compensation practices
Congress considered inappropriate. 01 Those practices came to light following
the collapse of Enron and other similar corporate scandals during the early
95. See Eric D. Chason, Deferred Compensation Reform: Taxing the Fruit of the Tree in Its
Proper Season, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 378 (2006) ("[P]ublic companies often require executives
to defer any base salary over $1 million."); William A. Drennan, Enron-Inspired Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation Rules: "If You Don't Know Where You're Going, You Might Not Get
There.," 73 TENN. L. REV. 415, 457 n.216 (2006) ("Commentators point out that the enactment
of the '$1 Million Cap' of Section 162(m) encouraged many corporations to adopt deferred
compensation plans for their executives earning over $1 million.").
96. Commentators have catalogued a variety of other § 162(m) flaws, including the
arbitrariness of the $1,000,000 limit, the lack of inflation index, and the inflexibility as to the
circumstances of individual companies. See Miske, supra note 4, at 1687-88; see also Murphy,
supra note 75, at 738-40; Polsky, supra note 4, at 920-25; Stabile, supra note 4, at 96-97.
97. Mullane, supra note 7, at 526.
98. Id.
99. Id
100. See id; see also Backdating Hearing, supra note 59, at 29-30 (statement of Steven
Balsam, Professor of Accounting, Temple University) (describing how research from 2005
indicated that numerous corporations were paying executives in excess of the $1,000,000 cap and
that "nearly 40 percent of corporations admitted to forfeiting deductions because of section
162(m)"); Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer Yin, Explaining Firm Willingness to Forfeit Tax
Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million-Dollar Cap, 24 J. ACCT.
& PUB. POL'Y 300, 322-23 (2005); Halperin et al., supra note 76, at 54 (noting a study from 1999
showed that "45 percent [of 297 firms] chose to forgo tax deductibility by not seeking
qualification"). But see Polsky, supra note 4, at 913 (concluding that under the managerial power
model "it would be rare for firms (particularly high-profile ones) to forfeit significant amounts of
deductions" because of "the potential negative public response").
101. See I.R.C. § 409A (2006).
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2000s.102 The targeted practices involved an executive's ability to secure the
funds in a nonqualified deferred compensation (NQDC) plan and to control the
timing of receipt of payments from an NQDC plan.103
The typical NQDC plan is only available to executives.' 04  Under such a
plan, a company and an executive agree to defer the company's payment of
compensation for the executive's services.' 05  A properly structured NQDC
plan allows companies to avoid the § 162(m) deduction limit and enables
executives to shift income tax consequences to a future year, when the
executive may be subject to a lower tax rate. o0 However, to postpone the
imposition of income tax, executives must not be allowed to demand the
deferred compensation at their whim; they must also bear some measure of risk
102. See Chason, supra note 95, at 348-49 ("[E]xecutive pensions became front-page news
with the collapse of Enron Corporation."); Drennan, supra note 95, at 417-18 (noting that
scandals surrounding "Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, HealthSouth, and others" were
met with large amounts of publicity and that such publicity "created an environment conducive to
fundamental reforms"); Brian Kopp, New Rules for Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans,
21 J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS 5, 5 (2005) ("The Enron debacle triggered a concern that some
executive compensation practices were getting out of hand."); Ethan Yale & Gregg D. Polsky,
Reforming the Taxation of Deferred Compensation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 571, 573 (2007) ("[I]n an
attempt to stymie some of the particular abuses uncovered in the Enron fiasco, Congress revised
the federal tax laws applicable to executive deferred compensation . . . .").
103. See JCT Compensation Report, supra note 90, at 2 ("Prior to the enactment of section
409A, the tax treatment of NQDC was governed by general tax principles. Several practices had
developed that allowed executives deferral of income inclusion, but inappropriate degrees of
security and control over amounts deferred. Section 409A was intended to address these
practices."); Chason, supra note 95, at 383-84 (explaining that § 409A "was enacted ... in order
to tighten the control and security limitations of prior law."); Drennan, supra note 95, at 454
(summarizing the pre-§409A flexibility of NQDC plans, which formerly included more
withdrawal trigger events, as well as modified terms and schedules).
104. See Chason, supra note 95, at 361 ("NQDC is effectively and formally limited to
executives and other highly paid employees."); see also Yale & Polsky, supra note 102, at 575
(explaining that NQDC plans "are maintained for the exclusive benefit of highly remunerated
employees").
105. See Chason, supra note 95, at 348 (providing an illustration of how NQDC plans are
formed and taxed).
106. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text; see also Chason, supra note 95, at 383
("First, NQDC gives lower- and middle-level executives an opportunity for income averaging.
These are the executives who might expect to be in a lower tax bracket upon retirement. Second,
NQDC allows the corporation to avoid the limits of Code § 162(m) .... ). Note, however, that a
company is prohibited from taking a deduction for NQDC until the executive includes it in
income. See I.R.C. §§ 83(h), 267(a)(2), 404(a)(1)(B), 404(a)(5). This potential drawback has not
stopped companies from compensating their executives with NQDC. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION AND
RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS 40 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter JCT Enron Report] ("Enron allowed its
executives to defer significant amounts of compensation even though Enron had to forego a
current deduction with respect to such amounts. The fact that Enron was apparently indifferent to
the deferral of its deduction provides further support for the need for changes to the tax treatment
of nonqualified deferred compensation.").
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that the company will be unable to pay the deferred compensation in the
future.10 7  Otherwise, the executive would be subject to income tax on the
earned compensation even though he or she had not yet received the
remuneration. 08
Since the enactment of § 162(m), NQDC plans have grown in popularity,
and NQDC has come to comprise a more significant portion overall of
executive compensation packages.109 It followed, then, that executives wanted
some measure of access to the substantial amounts invested in these plans and
for those funds to be as secure as possible, all without triggering a tax liability.
As a result, certain NQDC plan features were developed to provide some
measure of security and access, while also allowing executives to defer income
tax consequences until receipt."10 When the Enron scandal revealed some of
these NQDC plan features, Congress responded with § 409A.1'
Section 409A imposes various rules regarding when and under what
circumstances an NQDC plan participant can receive distributions.112 Failure
to comply with these rules subjects the deferred compensation under the
NQDC plan to current, rather than deferred, taxation, plus interest.113 Section
409A also imposes a twenty percent penalty tax on the participant for the
noncompliant NQDC, much like § 4999 of the golden parachute provisions."14
107. See Chason, supra note 95, at 348 ("A promise will not [suffice] if the executive has an
unqualified right to demand immediate payment . . . . [T]he executive must have a mere
unfunded promise to pay, which would be compromised if the corporation goes bankrupt or
becomes insolvent."); Mullane, supra note 7, at 500-05 (providing discussion and illustration of
those tax rules).
108. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 505.
109. For example, NQDCs comprised a major part of Enron's executive compensation. JCT
Enron Report, supra note 106, at 14.
110. Id. at 14, 40.
111. Chason, supra note 95, at 349 ("Congress responded [to the Enron scandal] with
hearings and enacted § 409A of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code") in October 2004 .... Much
of the debate leading up to Code § 409A focused on Enron (and like scandals) and asked whether
the . . . gates to deferral were too wide."); Drennan, supra note 4, at 2, 20 (explaining that § 409A
was created in response to the Enron crisis, and its legislative history only references the Joint
Tax Committee's Enron Compensation Report); Alvin D. Lurie, Grandpa Still Hiding in
Proposed Deferred Compensation Regs, 109 TAX NOTES 1187, 1189 (2005) (explaining § 409A
was a direct response to the Enron debacle").
112. See t.R.C. § 409A(a) (2006).
113. See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1) (including all deferred compensation under the plan unless it is
"subject to substantial risk of forfeiture and not previously included in gross income"). The
interest rate is one percentage point above the underpayment rate. See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(ii).
114. See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(i)(II); see also I.R.C. § 4999(a) ("There is hereby imposed
on any person who receives an excess parachute payment a tax equal to 20 percent of the amount
of such payment.").
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Though enacted in 2004," § 409A did not go into effect until 2009.' It is
thus premature to discuss the effects of § 409A. However, some commentators
imply that one purpose of § 409A is to restrain overall NQDC levels.117 That
motivation may have been part of post-Enron reform discussions, but there is
nothing in § 409A's legislative history mentioning that one of its purposes is to
act as an overall restraint." 8 Considering § 409A's design, it seems unlikely
that the suppression of overall NQDC levels was an intended aim. The 409A
tax penalty is imposed if the NQDC plan does not comport with specified
timing rules; it is not imposed on NQDC above a certain level, like the golden
parachute provisions (§§ 280G and 4999) or § 162(m)."l 9
It could be argued, though, that § 409A's requirements are so onerous as to
discourage compensation in the form of NQDC. In that way, § 409A would
act as an overall restraint on NQDC amounts. However, it is likely that
executive compensation packages would then be adjusted to shift
compensation to another form. As a result, overall compensation levels would
not be reduced even if NQDC levels were reined in.120 For example, an
executive could push for his or her compensation package to shift from NQDC
to current compensation. Such a shift would provide the executive with greater
security and access to his or her earned compensation, but it would also be
subject to current taxation. That tradeoff could be worthwhile in the
post-§409A environment and would be just another rearrangement in the
composition of executive pay packages in response to a tax penalty
provision.121 A shift toward more current compensation, however, could reap
115. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885(a), 118 Stat. 1418,
1634-39 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 409A).
116. I.R.S. Notice 2007-86, 2007-46 I.R.B. 990; I.R.S. Notice 2007-78, 2007-41 I.R.B. 780.
The IRS repeatedly issued transition relief delaying the date on which NQDC plans had to
comply with § 409A. I.R.S. Notice 2007-86, 2007-46 I.R.B. 990; I.R.S. Notice 2007-78, 2007-41
1.R.B. 780.
117. See, e.g., MICHAEL DORAN, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF
TAX POLICY 12 (The Urban Institute, 2004); see also Hussey, supra note 4, at 438-39.
118. See H.R. REP. No. 108-548, at 343 (2004) ("There is limited specific guidance with
respect to common deferral arrangements. The Committee believes that it is appropriate to
provide specific rules regarding whether deferral of income inclusion should be permitted.");
Richard Ehrhart, Section 409A - Treasury "Newspeak" Lost in the "Briar Patch," 38 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 747 (2005) (suggesting that Treasury interpretations would clarify
Congress's intent); see also Drennan, supra note 95, at 458 ("The legislative history of Section
409A provides almost no clues as to the rationale for its enactment.").
119. Compare I.R.C. § 409A (taxing compensation "at any time during a taxable year"), with
I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (taxing compensation that "exceeds $1,000,000").
120. See Drennan, supra note 95, at 487 ("If Section 409A discourages the deferral of
compensation, it will encourage the payment of more current compensation." (footnote omitted)).
121. From the company's perspective, to the extent the shift is toward performance-based
compensation, it would also be deductible to the company sooner than if the compensation were
paid on a deferred basis.
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negative unintended consequences, as has happened with previous changes to
pay composition in response to the enactment of a tax penalty provision.
Despite its brief existence, § 409A has been criticized for potentially
legitimizing, rather than deterring, NQDC by standardizing and clarifying the
rules governing the taxation of NQDC.123 As a result, NQDC plans could
possibly grow as companies and executives, once hesitant to structure such
124
plans amidst uncertainty, now feel more comfortable doing so. Equally as
important, § 409A did not alter, but merely tightened, the already existing rules
governing the taxation of NQDC.125  Therefore, the underlying tax
consequences, which arguably encourage companies and executives to agree to
defer compensation, did not change.126 This is viewed by some as problematic
because that tax deferral can confer a significant tax benefit on executives. 127
Furthermore, critics also assert that although § 409A fails to address
important issues surrounding the taxation of NQDC, it creates a complex web
of technical rules that will likely harm ordinary individuals who are not
122. See DORAN, supra note 117, at 2 (explaining that companies use deferred compensation
to retain executive loyalty and as an incentive to increase the value of the company stock); see
also Kathryn J. Kennedy, A Primer on the Taxation of Executive Deferred Compensation Plans,
35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 487, 497 (2002) ("For the corporation, an executive deferred
compensation plan permits the amount of the executive's compensation to be dependent on future
performance; [and] may be used as a retention device thereby providing forfeitures for earlier
departure or subsequent employment with a competitor (referred to as golden handcuffs) . . . .").
123. See Hussey, supra note 4, at 478 ("It seems that Congress may actually be encouraging
nonqualified deferred compensation by enacting § 409A. With § 409A, Congress has provided a
roadmap, albeit in parts confused, as to how nonqualified deferred compensation plans should be
structured to avoid constructive receipt. Will this encourage more executives and employers to
enter into these agreements?").
124. Id.
125. See Chason, supra note 95, at 360 (explaining that § 409A further restricts the
application of the constructive receipt and economic benefit doctrines to executive pay, but "does
not change the basic tax issues of NQDC plans"); Ehrhart, supra note 118, at 744 ("The law
explicitly supplements, rather than supplants, existing law . . . It is clear from the plain meaning
of § 409A that Congress intended to tighten the rules that govern . . . 'nonqualified deferred
compensation."'); Yale & Polsky, supra note 102, at 573 n.7 ("Instead, the legislation modestly
strengthened the preexisting tax rules in direct response to certain abuses uncovered in the fall of
Enron.").
126. See Chason, supra note 95; Daniel Halperin & Ethan Yale, Deferred Compensation
Revisited, 114 TAX NOTES 939, 939-40 (2007); Yale & Polsky, supra note 102, at 586-90.
127. See e.g., Chason, supra note 95, at 399 ("NQDC needs reform, as it allows for deferred
taxation on current compensation. Executives (with the help of their employers) can shift taxation
from high-tax earning years to low-tax retirement years. High-tax executives may also have the
opportunity to shift investment income to their low-tax employers. Thus, the choice between
payment today and payment in the future is distorted by the implicit (and potentially costly) tax
benefits."); DORAN, supra note 117, at I ("But the legislation misses the mark for effective
reform. It does little to address the long-standing improper tax subsidy for certain deferred
compensation arrangements.").
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intended targets of the legislation.128 This is because, unlike the golden
parachute provisions or § 162(m), § 409A's application is not limited to
executives. 29 Indeed, subject to exceptions, § 409A applies to any taxpayer
who defers compensation outside of a qualified plan, such as a 401(k).130
Executives of large, publicly-held corporations, however, will likely have
easier access to the legal assistance that is necessary to successfully navigate
§ 409A.
Instead of complying with § 409A, or shifting NQDC into current
compensation, a third option is for executives to bargain for more control over
NQDC than § 409A would permit.131 Choosing this latter option would result
in the imposition of § 409A's tax penalties, but it is unlikely that the executive
would bear the financial burden of these penalties.1 32 It is more likely that the
executive will have a gross-up agreement in place, as was the case with the
golden parachute provisions, whereby the company agrees to absorb the costs
of the tax penalties.133
As with large golden parachutes and robust compensation packages, the
Code does not prohibit NQDC plans with terms that fall outside § 409A, but
makes them more costly. 34 Nonetheless, this is a consequence that companies
have repeatedly shown they are willing to bear.' 35
128. Halperin & Yale, supra note 126, at 939-45 ("[In light of § 409A,] [t]axpayers now face
extremely complicated rules that are focused on the least important considerations and that
overlook the most important.").
129. Compare I.R.C. § 4999 (2006), and I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006), with I.R.C. § 409A (2006).
130. See I.R.C. § 409A(d)(1), (3) (defining an NQDC plan as "any plan that provides for the
deferral of compensation); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1(f) (2007) (defining service provider for
purposes of § 409A); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(14) (excluding from § 409A's reach
some situations in which it is the common practice for a service provider, such as a teacher, to
receive annualized (or deferred) compensation for a period of service that comprises less than a
full year); Drennan, supra note 4, at 26 ("[Section] 409A applies to all employers and employees
that defer compensation, including closely held corporations, subchapter S corporations,
partnerships, and charities."); Kopp, supra note 102, at 11 ("[T]he rules are a trap for the unwary
and may create more problems for small employers than large publicly traded companies.").
131. See Drennan, supra note 5, at 487.
132. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 531.
133. See DORAN,.supra note 117, at 13 ("[T]he power of managers to extract rents from their
companies implies that, wherever possible, managers will reallocate the risk of the dispreference
to the companies. They might do so, for example, through tax gross-up or indemnification clauses
in their contracts providing that, should the deferred compensation arrangement be determined to
violate the new rules, the companies will pay additional compensation to make the managers
whole (on an after-tax basis) for any resulting tax consequences.").
134. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; see also Mullane, supra note 7, at 531.
135. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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II. THE INHERENT INABILITY OF TAX PENALTIES TO CONTROL EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
Each of the previously described tax penalty provisions was designed to
discourage a particular executive compensation practice, whether it be large
golden parachute payments, large annual compensation payments that are
unrelated to job performance, or certain NQDC benefits. However, as
discussed above, each provision suffers from its own unique defects, rendering
them less effective than they could be.' 37 Even if attempts were made to
amend the statutory design of these provisions, taxpayers could still choose to
engage in the targeted conduct because the Code does not prohibit non-tax
behavior; it only affects the after-tax costs.138 Thus, as long as taxpayers are
willing to pay the increased penalties, the mere ability to choose can
significantly subvert the intended effect of the relevant tax penalty provision.
This ability is particularly problematic when the taxpayer is a corporation, as
opposed to an individual. Although resources are not unlimited, the type of
corporation that these penalty provisions target generally has the financial
latitude to incur the extra costs associated with subverting the provisions, and
many have chosen to do just that.139 Corporations can also, in theory, avoid
the additional costs by passing them on to consumers, shifting them to labor, or
diluting them across a wide number of shareholders or capital owners, thereby
undermining the deterrent effect of the penalties. 140 Furthermore, some of
these corporations, for tax purposes, have net operating losses such that they
do not even pay the corporate income tax. 141 If a corporation does not owe any
taxes, penalizing the corporation by denying them a deduction is particularly
ineffective.
The alternative of imposing tax penalties on individual executives, instead of
their companies, is also ineffective because gross-up agreements and other
compensation measures allow individuals to contract around the penalties. 142
In this way, though the executive avoids bearing the financial burden of the
penalties, his or her avoidance increases the company's compensation costs.
But, again, companies have not hesitated in shouldering those additional
costs.1 The lack of hesitation could be attributed to a variety of factors,
136. See supra Part I.A-C.
137. See supra Part l.A-C.
138. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
139. These companies can also generally afford to hire the best tax planners and advisers.
140. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 534-48.
141. See, e.g., U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-957, TAx ADMINISTRATION:
COMPARISON OF THE REPORTED TAX LIABILITIES OF FOREIGN-AND U.S.-CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS, 1998-2005 7 fig.1 (2008) (finding that many foreign and domestic corporations
doing business in the United States reported zero tax liability from 1998 through 2005).
142. See supra notes 56-62, 84-89, 93-95, 133-134 and accompanying text (describing the
different measures available to executives that render tax penalties ineffective).
143. See supra notes 59-60, 100 and accompanying text.
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including the fact that ultimately these costs are not borne by the company.144
A company, after all, is not a natural person, and only natural persons can bear
financial burdens. 145 Instead, these costs are passed on to a wide array of
individuals who are not the intended tarpets of the tax penalties, thus making
the burden of these penalties inequitable. 6
Despite missing their target, the executive compensation tax penalty
provisions have nevertheless altered corporate and executive behavior, though
probably not in the way Congress envisioned.147 Moreover, reaction to these
provisions has unintentionally led to other undesirable consequences. 148 Thus,
these provisions are also inefficient.
In the end, the utility of the tax code is limited, as it relies substantially on its
ability to affect the after-tax cost of a transaction. 149 Although each of the
executive compensation penalty provisions is superficially different, they
fundamentally operate in the same manner. In each instance, the relevant
provision affects the after-tax cost of engaging in the targeted conduct by
either: (1) denying a deduction to a company for the compensation it pays or
(2) imposing additional taxes on the compensation an executive receives. so
Such effective cost increases fit into the overall scheme of the tax system.
Nevertheless, that result is ineffective if the parties are exempt from, or
indifferent to, the augmented cost. Although the penalties may have deterred
some companies, many others have continued to engage in these targeted
practices or have otherwise maneuvered around the penalties to achieve
roughly the same ends. 151
Tax penalties on executive compensation are therefore ineffective,
inefficient, and inequitable.1 52 They are thus an inappropriate policy tool for
144. Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know, 1-2
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11686, 2005).
145. Id. at 2 (stating that "only individuals can bear the burden of taxation"); accord
ANDREW B. LYON, CRACKING THE CODE: MAKING SENSE OF THE CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE
MINIMUM TAX 49 (1997) ("Clearly only people can ultimately bear the burden of the corporate
tax . . . ."); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1055, 1101 (2000) ("[C]orporate entities do not bear the economic burden of the corporate
tax because only natural persons can bear economic burdens.").
146. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 534-48 (explaining that tax penalties on executive
compensation are inequitable because the burden often falls on rank-and-file Americans instead
of rich executives).
147. See supra notes 55, 59-60, 83, 86-87, 133 and accompanying text (giving examples of
ways that corporate and executive behavior respond to the tax penalty provisions).
148. See supra notes 60-63, 92, 133 and accompanying text.
149. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 489-90.
150. Id at 493-94.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63, 67.
152. See Michael Doran, Time to Start Over on Deferred Compensation, 28 VA. TAX REV.
223, 227 (2008) (evaluating the inequity of cost-bearing on shareholders under § 409A);
Hartmann, supra note 4, at 181 (discussing Congress's change of the incentive program to
regulate corporate behavior regarding takeovers); Zelinsky, supra note 4, at 141 (defining the
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regulating executive compensation. So, why does Congress continue to
propose and enact such tax penalties?
III. CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TAX PENALTIES ON
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Some legal scholars discuss legislation as serving an instrumental,
expressive, or symbolic function.' 5  Both instrumental and expressive
legislation aim to affect behavior.154 Instrumental legislation does so by
altering an actor's cost-benefit analysis. 5 5  Alternatively, expressive
legislation influences behavior by making a formal statement about behavioral
multiple interpretations and perspectives regarding golden parachutes); Zolt, supra note 8, at 355
(noting the bright-line punishments of golden parachute provisions, which have a minimal
relation to the actual harm). To be clear, this does not necessarily mean that all tax penalty
provisions are ineffective, inefficient, and inequitable. This Article is limited to assessing their
application to executive compensation. However, tax penalties aiming to shape non-tax behavior
have been criticized more generally:
[T]ax penalties are remarkably crude policy instruments. Although tax penalty
provisions succeed in increasing the after-tax cost of the activity, they fail to increase
the cost in a manner sufficiently related to the harm caused by the activity. On
economic grounds, the case for tax penalties is shaky at best. Tax penalties may also be
inequitable in that they treat offenders in a disparate fashion. The current tax system
imposes tax penalties for some offenses, but not for others. Those offenders with high
marginal rates bear greater dollar costs from tax penalties than offenders in lower tax
brackets or offenders not subject to the tax system. Because the cost of tax penalties
often depends on factors that bear no relationship to the harm caused or the offender's
culpability, little proportionality exists between the penalty and the severity of the
offense.
Zolt, supra note 8, at 344-45 (suggesting also that there are justifications for using tax penalties,
such as lower costs of administration and serving a symbolic function).
153. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law,
or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1254, 1264 (2000) (assessing
expressive and symbolic effects of federal hate crimes legislation); Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative
Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a
Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863, 869 (2004) (assessing the instrumental,
expressive, and symbolic effects of alternative sanctions for tax code abuses); Mark Tushnet &
Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (1997)
(assessing the instrumental, expressive, and symbolic effects of certain enacted legislation).
These three categories are not necessarily sharply distinguishable. Moreover, it is not always
easy or even possible to categorize a particular piece of legislation because "[e]very statute is
likely to contain a mix of instrumental, expressive, and symbolic content." Id. at 76. Note also
that, although closely related, examining the function of legislation is a different line of inquiry
than consideration of the democratic processes behind the enactment of legislation, which might
instead invoke discussions of pluralism or public choice theory, among other schools of thought,
none of which are germane to the purposes of this Article.
154. See Beale, supra note 153, at 1270-71; Kirsch, supra note 153, at 893-94; Tushnet &
Yackle, supra note 153, at 81-82.
155. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 153, at 74.
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expectations. Symbolic legislation, on the other hand, is enacted to respond
to public outcries for legislative action concernin a perceived problem, but
does not try to significantly change the status quo.
Congress's goal in enacting the various tax penalties on executive
compensation was to alter corporate and executive behavior through
legislation. This section examines these provisions from an instrumental
and expressive perspective. It reveals that tax penalties on executive
compensation do not have a meaningful instrumental or expressive effect.159
Therefore, Congress's attempt to alter executive behavior is not furthered by
continued enactment of these types of tax provisions.
A. Executive Compensation Tax Penalties as Instrumental Legislation
Purely instrumental legislation does not attempt to transform belief
systems. Yet, it does seek to change an actor's behavior by altering the
costs and benefits associated with a particular course of action.161 It follows,
then, that all tax penalties and tax incentives can be viewed as instrumental
legislation.162 As previously discussed, both tax penalties and incentives alter
the after-tax cost of engaging in certain non-tax activities with the aim of
encouraging or discouraging the targeted activity.' 6 3 Stated differently, they
aim to change taxpayer behavior by manipulating the taxpayer's cost-benefit
analysis and thereby the decisional outcome.
The executive compensation tax penalty provisions in particular are
designed to increase costs for companies offering or executives receiving
certain types or levels of compensation.'6 4  Thus, these provisions could
certainly be categorized as instrumental. However, they have largely been
156. Id. at 74-75; see also Kirsch, supra note 153, at 893, 913 (discussing how instrumental
and expressive laws affect social norms).
157. See Murray Edelman, Symbols and Political Quiescence, 54 AM. POL. SCL REV. 695,
699 (1960) (advancing a symbolic legislation theory); Steve R. Johnson, The Dangers of
Symbolic Legislation: Perceptions and Realities of the New Burden-Of-Proof Rules, 84 IOWA L.
REV. 413, 445-46 (1999) (noting that with the 1998 burden-of-proof rules "Congress has
protected taxpayers by giving them something which can only bark"); see also Bryan T. Camp,
Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REv. 1, 131 (2004) (critiquing the Revenue
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 and noting that "it may well be that the statute's protection
is more symbolic than real").
158. Mullane, supra note 7, at 489-91.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
160. See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 153, at 77 ("[Instrumental] statutes are concerned
with behavior, not values or attitudes.").
161. See id.
162. Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 122
(2009) (discussing how tax penalties alter a taxpayer's behavior).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
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ineffective in achieving their instrumental goals as discussed in Part 1.165 Then
why does Congress continue to use an ineffective means to regulate executive
compensation? After a decade of reflecting on the effects of the golden
parachute provisions, how did Congress reach the conclusion that § 162(m) (or
later, § 409A) was proper from an instrumental perspective? Enacting
legislation with the aim of having an instrumental effect seems to make little
sense if companies and executives, who shift additional costs back to the
company, repeatedly demonstrate that they are undeterred by increased costs.
Congress certainly could have believed that the golden parachute provisions
would be instrumentally effective when they were enacted. Given that
Congress had not previously attempted to regulate executive compensation
through increased costs, Congress fairly could have thought such penalties
would have a strong deterrent effect. However, as demonstrated, they did
not.166
Now assume that Congress reflected on the effects of the golden parachute
provisions prior to the enactment of § 162(m). Congress could have
determined that these provisions were largely ineffective because they
misfired.167 In other words, Congress failed to properly identify its "targets'
values and preferences with enough precision to have much effect."' 68
The erroneous assumption about the golden parachute provisions could have
been that companies would value saving revenue more than retaining
flexibility in negotiating golden parachute agreements with executives.
Learning from its prior experience, then, Congress could have concluded that
§ 162(m) would avoid the same ineffectual fate because it allowed for
significantly more flexibility in crafting compensation packages. Where there
was a lack of choice in the golden parachute arena, § 162(m)'s design created,
in effect, a menu of options for compensating executives, but all within the
boundaries delineated by Congress.' For example, compensation levels are
unimpeded by § 162(m)'s penalty if the compensation is tied to
performance. There are also myriad ways that parties can contract for
performance-based compensation, rendering that restriction quite flexible.172
165. See supra Part I.
166. See supra note 4.
167. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 153, at 78 n.373 (describing a legislative "misfire" as "a
close cousin to Justice Breyer's 'mismatch,' which he defines as 'a failure to correctly match the
tool to the problem at hand."').
168. Id.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45 (describing how companies could save
revenue by not agreeing to golden parachutes with payouts equal to or greater than the defined
level-three times an executive's base amount).
170. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing the exceptions to § 162(m)).
171. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
172. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 524; see also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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As discussed, some companies nevertheless choose to incur the § 162(m)
penalty by pa 'ing their executives more than $1,000,000 and not tying it to
performance. In one sense, though, § 162(m) has had a modicum of
success-it did change the composition of most executive compensation
packages. After § 162(m) was enacted, both performance-based compensation
and NQDC became more significant components of executive compensation
packages.174 Section 162(m) did not, however, restrain compensation levels or
make pay more responsive to performance.175 Thus, the alteration or change in
corporate "behavior" is a hollow one in the instrumental sense. Additionally,
the change in executive compensation practices led to negative unintended
consequences.176
Armed with the foregoing knowledge, then, it must again be questioned why
Congress would enact § 409A. Perhaps the underlying rationale for this
provision was that the penalty might be more effective if imposed directly on
the executive.177 But the lesson that should have been learned from the golden
parachute provisions, in particular § 4999, is that executives can and do shift
the burden of taxes back to the company through gross-up agreements.
The golden parachute provisions and § 162(m) both should have taught
Congress that restricting compensation in one area just diverts it to another,
which could make things worse, not better. The golden parachute provisions
may have had the effect of encouraging greater overall compensation levels.179
Rapidly increasing executive pay levels, sometimes seemingly unrelated to
performance, was one of the factors that led to the enactment of § 162(m).1so
For its part, § 162(m) encouraged performance-based pay, as well as NQDC.181
As to the former, heavy emphasis on performance-based pay is viewed as a
173. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 90, 95 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 92, 102 and accompanying text (noting that performance-based
compensation has shifted executives' attention to short-term profitability at the expense of
long-term health, and § 162(m) has encouraged executive compensation to take the form of
deferred payments, which were at the center of notable corporate scandals in the early 2000s,
including Enron).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14 (discussing that the penalty provisions of
§ 409A are imposed on the recipient of the deferred compensation). Imposing a penalty on the
company in the form of a deduction denial like § 280G and 162(m) would make no sense because
NQDC is already not deductable by the company until it is included in the executive's income.
Carter G. Bishop & Marian McMahon Durkin, Nongranted Deferred Compensation Plans: A
Review and Critique, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 43, 54 (1991).
178. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 517-18 (discussing gross-up compensation); see also
supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57 (finding that increasing an executive's base
compensation is one way to subvert the 2.99 times base limit). Section 162(m) also had this same
result. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
180. See supra text accompanying note 76.
181. See supra notes 90, 94-95 and accompanying text.
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significant contributor to the aforementioned accounting and other corporate
scandals.182 With regard to the latter, receiving a greater proportion of one's
pay in the distant future, in the form of NQDC, naturally led to executives
negotiating terms to secure that pay as well as make it more accessible.,83
Those practices are precisely what Congress was targeting with §409A.184 The
reaction to § 409A, in turn, very well might be a reemphasis on
performance-based pay or current pay unrelated to performance. The
consequences of another shift in pay composition are as of yet unknown, but
certainly could be negative.
In any event, Congress has miscalculated the executive compensation
cost-benefit effect. Some companies and executives maneuver around the
penalties in such a way as to frustrate the provisions' purposes.' 85 Many others
willingly choose to incur the penalties, having decided that it is to their net
benefit to contract for contrary compensation packages.1 86
In sum, tax penalties on executive compensation do not serve an effective
instrumental purpose.'8 The question then becomes whether these provisions
serve some other meaningful purpose.
B. Executive Compensation Tax Penalties as Expressive Legislation
An emerging area of legal scholarship has been focused on how law may
affect behavior in ways beyond tinkering with an actor's cost-benefit
calculation.'8 Some believe that law can serve an expressive function,
affecting behavior "by what it says in addition to what it does."l89 Exactly
182. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 109-110.
184. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 57-63, 89-91 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 98-100 and accompanying text.
187. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 495.
188. See e.g., Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law
and CEO Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 214 (2008) ("The rich vein of inquiry unearthed
by scholars working on social norms theories has produced a welter of provocative writings on
the expressive functions of the law."); Kirsch, supra note 153, at 913 ("A considerable body of
recent legal scholarship addresses the expressive function of legislation."). This Article is not
intended to provide an in depth history or analysis of this rich area of scholarship. For an
excellent primer on the development of expressive law scholarship, see generally Alex Geisinger,
A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 38-41 (2002) (explaining that
traditional scholars of law and economics have generally been committed to the notion that law
affects opportunity through rational choice, but the express function of law looks at the ability of
law to reflect the social meaning of a particular act).
189. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1651 (2000); see also Kirsch, supra note 153, at 913 ("[A] statute reflects expressive
functions if it is intended to change its target's conduct not by increasing the cost of engaging in
undesirable behavior, but by altering social norms. This alteration in social norms may affect the
target's behavior by causing him to internalize the new norm, changing his preferences, or in
some other way."); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
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how the expressive function of law operates to alter behavior is still a very
open line of inquiry.' 9 0 This is so partly because this area of study is in its
relative infancy, and partly because there is more than one way in which
expressive law can alter behavior.191
A prominent scholar in this area, Professor Richard H. McAdams, has set
forth several theories on how expressive legislation might work to change an
actor's behavior.192 One theory posits that law affects behavior by creating
focal points that allow individuals to coordinate their activities.' 93 McAdams
uses a simple introductory example to demonstrate his theory:
A legal proclamation-"Drive on the right"--even one that
carries no threat of sanctions, may cause people to drive on the right
just because the proclamation makes everyone expect that others will
drive on the right. The central issue, of course, is why a sanctionless
proclamation would cause people to change their expectations of
what others will do. As I will show, when people are otherwise at a
loss for how to coordinate, it takes surprisingly little to guide
expectations and behavior. Once expectations are changed, the
coordination problem is solved: A driver who expects others to drive
on the right will almost always prefer to drive on the right as well.
2021, 2022 (1996) ("Many people support law because of the statements made by law, and
disagreements about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of law."); Tushnet &
Yackle, supra note 153, at 81 ("[Expressive laws] too are designed to change their targets'
behavior, but they operate by changing their targets' values and preferences rather than by
changing the costs and benefits associated with the targets' existing values and preferences.").
190. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 153, at 915 ("While legal scholars are in general agreement
that the expressive effect of legislation can effect changes in social norms and thereby alter
individuals' behavior, there is disagreement as to how and the extent to which this phenomenon
occurs."); Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 153, at 81 ("Exactly how [expressive statutes] change
values is something of a puzzle.").
191. A number of viable theories regarding how expressive law alters behavior have been put
forward in the literature. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585, 586 (1998); Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet Jury
Theorem and the Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & EcON.
REV. 1, 2-4 (2003) (arguing that, in situations in which new information creates uncertainty, the
passage of a law may cause a rational individual to update her belief about the law's subject
matter); Geisinger, supra note 189, at 37; Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of
Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 340 (2000); McAdams, supra note 189, at 1651; Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603,
1606-07 (2000).
192. See Dharmapala & McAdams, supra note 191; McAdams, supra note 191; McAdams,
supra note 189, at 1651.
193. See McAdams, supra note 189, at 1650-51. Professor Cass R. Sunstein has discussed a
similar theory in his work. See Sunstein, supra note 189, at 2024-25, 2032-33 (discussing an
aspect of the expressive function of law called "norm cascades," which uses incentives to shift
behavior in new directions).
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The state can thus change behavior by changing expectations; self-
interest does the rest.194
McAdams's focal point theor' explains one way in which law can be used
expressively to affect behavior. In the above example, the law is used to
foster the adoption of a particular behavior: driving on the right side of the
road. This theory works in situations where coordination is needed and a norm
has not yet been established, but can also work in situations where there is an
already existing norm that lawmakers would like to change. 196 In exploring the
latter notion, McAdams uses a public smoking example to demonstrate how
laws can be used to change a prevailing norm.
Simplifying McAdams's example, imagine a time when smoking is
prevalent and non-smoking regulations are nonexistent.198 In this context,
non-smokers remain quiescent in the vicinity of smokers.199 Next, assume a
law is enacted creating non-smoking areas in airports. That act creates a
competing focal point to that of smokers, as non-smokers will begin
congregating in the designated non-smoking areas. Over time, non-smokers
develop a voice and a presence, empowering them to enforce the no-smoking
rules against would-be smokers. Eventually, the social norm in the airport, as
well as other public places, could become non-smoking rather than smoking.200
In this way, the law has changed the behavior of smokers and nonsmokers
regardless of the presence or absence of formal sanctions.
Another of McAdams's theories-referred to as an attitudinal theory of
expressive law-suggests "that law changes behavior by signaling the
underlying attitudes of a community or society." 201 There are three premises
underlying this theory. First, it assumes that individuals often strive to behave
in ways that will elicit approval from others.20 2  Second, it claims that
individuals often fail to ascertain what kinds of acts will garner such
194. See McAdams, supra note 189, at 1652.
195. Id. at 1651.
196. See id at 1652-53 ("Independent of sanctions, law can both cause individuals to
converge on a particular convention more quickly than they otherwise would and upset the
conventions that have already emerged.") (emphasis added).
197. See id. at 1714-22.
198. See id Throughout his paper, and in the public smoking example, McAdams relies on a
number of game theory concepts in his analysis. Id. at 1654 ("[A]lthough I rely on numerous
game theory concepts, my analysis is mostly informal.").
199. See id. at 1714 ("Each player[, smokers and nonsmokers,] wants to 'get his way'-by
smoking or preventing the other from smoking-but each also wants to avoid an embarrassing
scene' that occurs when both players insist on getting their way.").
200. See id. at 1720.
201. McAdams, supra note 191, at 340.
202. See id. ("First, there is a motivational assumption that an individual's behavior depends,
in part, on what actions she believes others will approve or disapprove. The motivating power of
approval may arise because the individual values approval for its own sake, or as an instrument
for achieving some other end.").
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203approval. Third, it posits that laws can signal or reveal to individuals
whether others will likely approve or disapprove particular conduct.204
"Because people are motivated to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the
information signaled by legislation and other law affects their behavior,"
independent of the presence of a formal sanction. 205
In the end, McAdams's and other scholars' theories on the expressive
function of the law appear to coalesce around two main ideas.206 First, given
the right conditions, the law may genuinely alter individual preferences and
thereby alter their behavior.207 Second, the law may alter behavior, although
individual preferences for acting a certain way may remain unchanged, by
203. See id ("Second, there is a claim that individuals have imperfect information about what
others approve and that their beliefs about such matters are frequently (though not inevitably)
mistaken. Given their concern for approval, individuals are therefore sensitive to new sources of
information.").
204. See id. ("Third, there is a claim that democratically produced legislative outcomes are
positively correlated with popular attitudes and therefore provide a signal of those attitudes.
Independent of the sanction, the legislative signal influences behavior by causing people to
update their prior beliefs about what others approve and disapprove.").
205. Id.; see also Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 153, at 81 ("Some targets may wish to
conform their behavior to what a majority of the population desires, but may simply be ignorant
of what that is. An expressive statute may serve as a public statement of the majority's values,
thereby clarifying the situation for these otherwise clueless targets. . . . An expressive statute,
then, is a means of public education."). This is also similar to a theory discussed by Professor
Sunstein, who has noted that the expressive function of the law can be one of public education
and that such laws may "signal[] appropriate behavior" and lead their targets to believe correctly
that failure to act in the indicated way will subject them to criticism by others. See Sunstein,
supra note 189, at 2032.
206. See supra note 189; see also Michael Ashley Stein, Under The Empirical Radar: An
Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1173 (2004) ("When designed
appropriately, law can cause individuals to alter their own behavior because either the law
induces them to change their tastes (internalization), or creates a fear of bearing social sanctions
(second order sanctions), or because of pressure brought to bear upon them through societal
sanction (third order sanctions)."). One expressive law scholar, by way of the common example
of a statute banning public smoking, has succinctly illustrated the main theories on the expressive
function of law as follows:
The effect of this statute on Marlboro Man, an exuberant smoker, can be threefold.
Passage of the anti-smoking ordinance can (1) educate Marlboro Man that smoking
really is a bad activity in which to engage, not only for himself, but also for fellow
citizens within reach of second-hand smoke and for animals who may choke on
cigarette butts, and so change his desire to smoke; or (2) have no affect at all on
Marlboro Man's personal desire to smoke, but result in fear of social condemnation
from others who witness his public smoking causing him either to curb his addiction or
to practice it in private; and/or, in combination with either or both of the previous two
possibilities, (3) cause other members of Marlboro Man's society to bear social
pressure and condemnation upon him until he abstains from public smoking.
Id. at 1174.
207. See McAdams, supra note 189, at 1682. For example, drivers will prefer to, and will,
drive on the right.
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creating "a fear of bearing social sanctions." 208 In other words, individuals
would be ashamed to behave in ways that society disapproves of, even if that is
what they personally would prefer.
In light of these theories, it would be proper to ask whether the tax penalties
on executive compensation could have been enacted to serve an expressive
function. Could Congress have enacted these provisions in an attempt to
change corporate and executive behavior by altering social norms surrounding
that behavior? Perhaps; however, if that was the intent, it has yet to come to
fruition, as corporations have continued to lavishly compensate their
executives despite these tax penalties. 209
When each of the executive compensation tax penalty provisions was
enacted, Congress claimed it wanted to upset the relevant emerging pay
convention and affect corporate and executive behavior in some way.
Perhaps Congress believed that the executive compensation tax penalties could
serve an expressive function in addition to, or instead of, an instrumental one.
Perhaps the message of societal distaste embedded in the instrumental sanction
could cause a norm shift in executive compensation, much like McAdams's
example showing a norm shift from smoking to non-smoking in public
airports.
With the golden parachute provisions, the hoped-for effect could have been,
for example, a shift in the takeover environment from one in which exorbitant
golden parachutes are used as an antitakeover measure to an environment
where more reasonable golden parachutes are used merely to provide a safety
net for the executive in the event of a takeover. The law, here, could have had
a coordinating effect. Instead of a race to the bottom (or, more appropriately,
to the top of the pay scale), the golden parachute provisions could have
coordinated corporate and executive pay expectations so that a golden
parachute would be 2.99 times base salary and no more, analogizing to the
scenario in which everyone would drive on the right. It could also have
created a different kind of coordinating solution, or "focal point," that
empowered interested groups, such as institutional investors, to develop a
stronger voice in pay matters.2 11
208. Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60
VAND. L. REV. 77, 84 (2007) (explaining that an aptly drafted law can change human behavior by
taking into account the connection between law, norms, and the significance of certain social
behaviors).
209. See Conway, supra note 4, at 410 (noting that § 162(m) was ineffective and instead of
curbing executive pay, companies responded to the legislation by paying their executives in stock
rather than cash); Drennan, supra note 4, at 10-15 (providing examples of valuable stock options,
severance packages, and fringe benefits given to executives even after legislation was passed).
210. See supra Part l.A-C.
211. See McAdams, supra note 189, at 1659 (explaining that focal points are special
solutions that appeal to many people and help with coordinating reactions to problems).
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Parallel suppositions can be made in the contexts of §§ 162(m) and 409A.
Section 162(m) could have caused a norm shift from widely variant executive
pay levels, seemingly unconnected to performance, to a corporate world where
pay is correlated with performance and executives otherwise make no more
than $1,000,000. Section 409A likewise could create a shift by eliminating
variation and standardizing NQDC practices.
The problem with various aspects of the focal point theory is that corporate
and executive self-interests are not served by coordinating and conforming pay
practices.212 Unlike the rules-of-the-road example, in which failure to drive on
the right side could lead to injury or worse, abiding by the legislatively
preferred executive pay practices would likely leave an executive earning less
than peers who are paid by companies that choose to absorb any penalties and
to continue to compensate handsomely.213 This is due in large part to the
culture surrounding executive pay, where each executive aims to make more
than fifty to seventy-five percent of his peers, reflecting his or her above
average worth to the company. 214 In other words, everyone is competing to be
one of the more highly compensated executives in his or her peer group.
Similarly, companies offer competitive com ensation packages to attract and
retain the best executive talent they can find.
In the end, executive compensation does not present an issue of
coordination. Viewed from the perspective of McAdams's attitudinal theory,
the executive compensation tax penalties should have at least sent a clear
signal about society's disapproval of the relevant pay practice, be it lucrative
golden parachutes, exorbitant overall compensation levels unrelated to
performance, or robust executive deferred compensation perquisites.2 Each
of the tax penalty provisions was enacted amidst significant, negative popular
212. See id. (explaining that to coordinate solutions, the parties must be amenable to the same
course of action).
213. See, e.g., Lublin & Thurm, supra note 60 (pointing out that many companies ignore caps
on executive pay, opting to take the tax penalties).
214. See, e.g., Eugene Kandel, In Search ofReasonable Executive Compensation, 55 CESIFO
ECON. STUD. 405, 412 (2009) ("After all, no board wants to admit that their chosen CEO is of
lower quality than the average, thus her compensation must be above the average as well, which
drives the average forever higher."); Jeff May, Peer Pressure Pays: Rising Compensation is Tied
to Competition, STAR-LEDGER, June 1, 2008, at 1 ("Besides choosing inappropriate peers, some
companies set pay targets at the high end of the comparison group, such as the 75th percentile.");
Gretchen Morgenson, Peer Pressure: Inflating Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 3, at
8 (explaining how companies will define peer groups so that their executives are in the fiftieth to
seventy-fifth percentile range).
215. See Kandel, supra note 214, at 408, 412 ("[P]ressure from the market for managers
forces firms to develop the optimal compensation strategies, because otherwise they fail to attract
talented managers .... 'We must pay the market rates to attract and retain the necessary talent' is a
sentence frequently used.").
216. See McAdams, supra note 191, at 340 (positing that democratically produced legislation
will reflect and signal popular attitudes).
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217
sentiment toward executive pay. In theory, these provisions would have
conveyed to corporations the widespread public disapproval of the targeted
executive pay practices. That message would, in turn, shame companies and
their executives to conform those pay practices in accordance with the
parameters set forth in the relevant tax provision. Although adjustment
occurred, shame was not the motivating part of the equation.
To some extent, many companies and their executives did adjust their pay
practices as a result of the penalty provisions. In the case of each provision,
commentators have noted their legitimizing effect.218 Recall for example that
one effect of § 162(m) was that many executives immediately got a pay raise
to $1,000,000.219 Section 280G had a similar legitimizing effect, as is
predicted for § 409A as well.220 A message was, therefore, received.
However, the executive compensation tax penalty provisions were not
enacted to endorse and encourage greater compensation levels and benefits
than executives were previously receiving. Rather, these provisions were
enacted to restrain and constrain.221 They did, however, have some measure of
an endorsement effect.222 To an extent, this makes sense, as the provisions
outline where the line is drawn as to what is acceptable and what is not. 22 It is
thus somewhat predictable that many would react by, at a minimum,
positioning themselves at that line. This is what is referred to above as the
legitimizing effect of these provisions. 224
Nonetheless, the executive compensation tax penalty provisions send a clear
message of disapproval with regard to compensation and benefits beyond the
limits authorized, and seemingly endorsed, by Congress. Outside the
parameters of the particular provision, a tax penalty is imposed that increases
the effective cost of the compensation.225 That is a strong indicator of
disapproval.
217. See Mullane, supra note 7, at 513-14, 519-20, 526.
218. See supra notes 55, 84 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part 1A-C (describing Congress's goal to be one of deterrence when they
enacted the restrictive legislation); see also Byrne, supra note 83, at 1 (noting that Congress did
not intend to set a "minimum wage" of $1,000,000 for CEOs; instead, it aimed to put the brakes
on intemperate remuneration).
222. See supra notes 55, 84 and accompanying text.
223. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006) (limiting deductions, subject to exceptions, to $1,000,000
for compensation paid to top executives); I.R.C. § 280G (stating there is no deduction for excess
parachute payments, and then defining excess parachute payments); 1.R.C. § 409A (governing the
receipt of compensation through NQDC plans); I.R.C. § 4999(a)-(b) (imposing a twenty percent
tax on excess parachute payments, and defining excess parachute payments according to § 280G).
224. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
225. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (denying a deduction for certain remuneration that exceeds
$1,000,000); I.R.C. § 280G(a) (penalizing excess parachute payments by denying a deduction);
I.R.C. § 4999(a) (imposing a twenty percent tax on excess parachute payments).
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Nevertheless, at many companies, the targeted executive pay practices
226continued unabated. Others altered their practices, but in a way that did not
227lead to any meaningful change. Commentators predicted these results prior
to the enactment of the golden parachute provisions. 228  Despite such
predictions, it could have made sense for Congress to give the golden
parachute tax penalties a chance to have a significant impact. When it became
clear, however, that many companies and their executives were not shamed
into conforming their golden parachute agreements to fall within the limit set
by § 280G, Congress would have had to rethink the utility of using the Code to
make a statement about executive pay practices.
Congress did not learn its lesson, though. Instead, it subsequently enacted
§ 162(m). That provision should have signaled to corporations and executives
that Americans disapprove of pay in excess of $1,000,000 unless it is tied to
performance. Once again, that message has failed to fully resonate with and
shame executives and their companies into behaving differently or in an
approved way.229 Many companies continue to pay executives more than
$1,000,000 regardless of performance.230 Even when companies have
increased the share of executive pay that is performance-based within the
meaning of § 162(m), executives appear to experience only the benefits of
23good performance and do not suffer for bad performance.231 Of note, though,
226. See Conway, supra note 4, at 424-25.
227. Id at 419-22.
228. See generally Mullane, supra note 7, at 519 (asserting that it was apparent at the time
the golden parachute provisions were enacted that they would be ineffective). As one
commentator noted, "Congress has, as usual, made an opening move in a corporate chess game
and neglected to consider its opponents' countermoves." Graef S. Crystal, Manager's Journal:
Congress Thinks It Knows Best About Executive Compensation, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1984, at
16. Shortly after enactment of the two provisions, other commentators hypothesized that
indemnification provisions in executive contracts would arrange for the corporation to bear the
twenty percent excise tax. See Edwin T. Hood & John J. Benge, Golden Parachute Agreements:
Reasonable Compensation or Disguised Bribery?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 199, 213-14 (1985)
(assessing effects of § 280G and § 4999 and referring to provisions as "rather draconian").
229. See generally Conway, supra note 4, at 410-14 (analyzing how corporations and
executives found a way around Congress's intent behind § 162(m)).
230. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
23 1. See, e.g., Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive
Compensation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 301, 312 (1995) ("[S]tock options ... carry no downside risk
for the executive."); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach To
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 66 (1992) ("Many compensation packages are
constructed so that the executive profits in good times and is protected in bad. If stock prices
decline, the executive may lose his bonus, but he may have the ability to renegotiate the option
portion of his existing plan to lower the strike price, the price at which the option can be
exercised. Thus, the executive is rewarded regardless of his or the corporation's performance and
is simultaneously insulated from the ravages suffered by fellow shareholders if stock value
declines."); Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partnership
Lens: A Tool To Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 153, 216 (2000) (criticizing option
repricing as insulating executives from losses, while allowing them to reap the benefit of gains);
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is that the shift in emphasis to performance-based pay generally led to
increased overall compensation levels.2 32
If Congress was seeking to enact expressive legislation, then the evidence
indicating that executive compensation tax penalty provisions were failing to
have an expressive effect should have resonated with Congress prior to
enacting subsequent provisions. Apparently, it did not. It could be said,
though, that it is nevertheless good for Congress to continue to signal
disapproval through legislation, even if that message is not internalized by
many of the targeted companies and their executives. As already mentioned,
though, each of these provisions has generated negative unintended
consequences.233 As Professor Sunstein has written: "If legal statements




Tax penalties on executive compensation have not been instrumentally or
expressively effective. To the extent these penalties have affected corporate
and executive behavior, they have not done so in a way that generates enough,
if any, positive returns. However, the negative unintended consequences of
these penalties have been abundant.
Put simply, tax penalties are not a good tool for trying to regulate
executive compensation practices. Yet, Congress has continued to enact, or
propose enactment of, this type of regulation. However, this Article shows that
it is no longer reasonable, and has not been for some time, for Congress to
consider tax penalties an effective vehicle for enacting instrumental or
expressive legislation regulating executive compensation.
If Congress wants to enact effective legislation to regulate executive
compensation, then it needs to learn and accept that tax penalties are not the
way to achieve those ends. From there, Congress could begin serious
consideration of alternate solutions.235 One of the first assessments that
Linda Barrett, Note, Unsharing the Wealth: Recent Economic Volatility Has Greatly Impacted
Executive Compensation, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 293, 319-20 (2001) (opining that option repricing
not only allows executives to reward themselves when the company's performance is poor, but
also provides them little incentive to fix the source of the problem that led to the poor
performance); Alison Leigh Cowan, Mom, Apple Pie and Stock Options?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
1994, at Cl5. But cf Richard A. Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and
the Partner-Manager, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 283-84 (asserting that repricing may serve valid
business purposes).
232. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
234. See Sunstein, supra note 189, at 2025.
235. This discussion proceeds from the assumption that Congress wants to regulate executive
compensation, and does not consider whether Congress should be, or to what extent, engaged in
such regulation.
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Congress should then make is whether other Code-based solutions could be
workable, or if instead Congress should look outside of the Code.
It is not likely that a Code-based approach to regulating
executive compensation would be workable. This Article has already
discussed some of the problems with using tax penalties to discourage
executive compensation practices. The reverse, tax incentives to encourage
desirable compensation practices, is likely also not workable. Although further
research is needed regarding that option, executive compensation tax
incentives are likely to suffer from similar weaknesses as tax penalties.
Corporations and executives can choose to forego the incentive, or to comply
to receive the incentive and then find another way to achieve their overall
compensation goals. Thus, in the end, there is likely no positive role for the
Code to play in regulating executive compensation.
It seems much more plausible that direct non-tax regulation would be
effective. For example, Congress could, in theory, mandate that companies
pay their executives no more than a certain amount. Such direct regulation
certainly would achieve the goal of ensuring that executives are not paid above
a specified amount. However, such direct legislation is not as easily enacted as
tax penalty legislation. Americans tend to recoil at such interference in
personal contracting, and it also offends their laissez-faire sensibilities.
Nevertheless, limitations of this type on executive compensation were recently
236enacted to apply to organizations participating in the TARP program. This
shows it is not impossible to enact direct non-tax limitations, but it is not likely
that the TARP limits will be extended beyond the reach of those participating
in the TARP program to companies more generally.
Another option is imposing direct fine or penalties on either the company or
the executive. This path might be slightly less offensive to many strongly held
American ideals than imposing a cap. Even so, it is probably not a good
option. The economic incidence of those penalties is likely to be shifted off of
the company or executive and onto others whom the fines and penalties were
not meant to penalize.237
Congress can and should also consider less direct non-tax approaches, such
as measures to strengthen corporate governance structures. In reaction to the
recent financial crisis, Congress did take steps in that direction with the
say-on-pay provision238 and other measures enacted in the Dodd-Frank Act.239
Arguably, though, these measures were modest and Congress could explore
doing more.
236. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Attempts to Curb
Perceived Abuses, 2 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 196, 241-53 (2010) (describing the limitations
applicable to TARP recipients).
237. See Mullane, supra note 7,passim.
238. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
239. See id
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Perhaps, though, Congress is not seriously interested in effectively altering
corporate and executive behavior. Tax legislation attempting to regulate
executive compensation could be just symbolic. In other words, the legislation
"serves the needs of the public by indicating that Congress is 'doing
something' about a perceived problem," while actually doing nothing.240 But,
the executive compensation tax penalties do not "do nothing." They have
attendant negative consequences.241
240. See Kirsch, supra note 153, at 921.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37. These negative consequences likely can only
be remedied by repeal of the tax penalty provisions. Repeal is not likely, though, for what should
be fairly obvious political reasons. No one in Congress wants to be cast, rightly or wrongly, as
championing executives and what likely would be framed as helping companies to pay their
executives more handsomely at taxpayer expense.
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